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In Charlie Chaplin’s Modern Times (1936), Charlie’s bumbling factory worker is harnessed 
to the experimental Billows Feeding Machine, “a practical device which automatically feeds 
your men while at work.”1 The machine, the film’s “mechanical salesman” (a record player) 
announces, “will eliminate the lunch hour, increase your production, and decrease your 
overhead” by automating the activity of eating. Surrounded by suited executives, Charlie, in 
dungarees, is fed by the machine. Soon enough, however, the device short circuits, speeds up 
and spatters, causing culinary mayhem. The scene rails against the automation of the intimate 
act of eating. If automation transforms vital acts of nourishment into fuelling exercises by 
assimilating the individual into the assembly line of production and consumption, the same 
could be said of the cinema as a system whose heavily processed product is served up for 
mass consumption for maximum efficiency and profit. Modern Times is, then, partly a 
critique of film, most notably, perhaps, in its ambivalence towards sound technology, which, 
nearly a decade after the introduction of the talkies, Chaplin selectively and begrudgingly 
adopts.  
 
I. Cinema and devouring 
The cinema utilizes the world as its raw material, framing, editing, and polishing it in post-
production for audience consumption. The camera is no dispassionate observer. The objects it 
holds in its sights are baited, elicited, and entered into the world within the frame. Cinematic 
objects become vehicles of meaning, conductors of feeling, reflective surfaces onto which 
viewers project their own desires, caught up in the collective urges and aches of the time. 
Strapped to the machine, Chaplin’s hapless employee becomes a proxy for the cinemagoer, 
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who, like the fictional Alex in A Clockwork Orange (Kubrick, 1971) or Joe Frady in The 
Parallax View (Pakula, 1974), is placed in front of the screen and fed images and sounds.  
But the viewer is no passive victim. As psychoanalytical and feminist film theorists 
have shown, looking in the cinema is inextricably linked to acts of powered consumption. 
The objects of sight are consumed in what Sartre described as “the double meaning of an 
appropriative destruction and an alimentary enjoyment.” In her classic essay “Visual Pleasure 
and Narrative Cinema,” Laura Mulvey famously argued that this structure of looking 
confirms a “male gaze” that marginalizes and objectifies women on screen, a gaze whose 
payoff is scopophilic pleasure.2  
The male gaze is made literal (and parodic) in Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho (1960), in 
which motel owner Norman Bates first spies on Marion Crane through a hole in the wall, 
then proceeds to knife her to death.3 Before the fateful shower scene, the two share an 
evening meal. They face each other in the motel parlour, tightly framed by the camera and by 
Norman’s mounted stuffed birds. Norman remarks that Marion eats like one. Eating, 
consuming, and killing (snuffing out and stuffing birds) are strung together via the optics of 
voyeurism. The voyeur is the consummate consumer: he wants to devour—to possess in 
full—the object of sight, to make her his own; which is why, true to cinematic convention, 
voyeurism, facilitated by the male-identified camera, leads to murder.4  
But the dominance of voyeurism in theories of the gaze can be overstated. For objects 
gazed at in film can also be resistant, opaque, closed off to the machinations of the voracious 
observer. The transfer from world into film-world may even enhance objects’ 
impenetrability, rendering them solid, autonomous, more pronounced. Something of this 
recalcitrance of the cinematic object is, I think, captured by the effect early film theory called 
photogénie: “any aspect of things, beings or souls whose moral character is enhanced by 
filmic reproduction.”5 When objects resist appropriation, they appear as if from a distance, 
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fortified by unavailability, as what exists but cannot be fully possessed. In this case, the 
reality of the cinematic object is the measure of its resistance to appropriation by the 
observer-voyeur. Qualifying our approach, objects affirm their reality as something we 
witness without consuming. Instead of looking-as-devouring, gathering the world into our 
private sphere, looking consents to the being of objects as external to us, persisting beyond 
our grasp.  
The cinema, then, is a system of rampant consumption and preservation that lends 
itself to the analogy between looking and eating. Eating consumes and destroys the object. To 
look like we eat means to ingest and digest the object until it is no more. To look but not eat 
is to accept the existence of things beyond our own satiation. The analogy between looking 
and eating connects culinary with visual habits. Can we eat without destroying? Look without 
appropriating? Enjoy without acquiring? Veganism and film share some common problems. 
What I am calling “vegan cinema” conjoins looking and eating by construing the notion of 
the non-devouring gaze to respond positively to the above questions.  
 
II. Looking and eating 
The looking/eating analogy recurs throughout the writings of philosopher and mystic Simone 
Weil (1909-1943). For Weil, eating and looking are closely related yet fundamentally 
different activities. “The great sorrow of human life,” wrote Weil in Waiting for God, “is 
knowing that to look and to eat are two different operations. Only on the other side of heaven, 
where God lives, are they one and the same […] Maybe the vices, depravities and crimes are 
nearly always or even always in their essence attempts to eat beauty, to eat what one can only 
look at.”6 Eating is violent since it ingests and assimilates the other into the self, and destroys 
it. Once the objects of the world have been thoroughly incorporated and digested, they are 
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lost to the world and to the observer. This loss is both aesthetic and ethical, and its 
implications for film are far-reaching.   
The beautiful, for Weil, resists assimilation by the devouring I/eye. The beautiful is 
neither necessarily pretty nor visually pleasing. For Weil, the beautiful affords access to the 
real, precisely because it is immune to the overtures of the individual imagination. Immunity 
is reality, and thus also beauty. As an experience, beauty is the disinterested recognition of 
the existence of something beyond ourselves.7 “We want to eat all the other objects of desire. 
The beautiful is that which we desire without wishing to eat it. We desire that it should be.” 
The beautiful is, like food, “a carnal attraction” that, unlike food, “keeps us at a distance and 
implies a renunciation.”8 Thus, beauty involves a “letting be” of the object before us. In place 
of the hungry gaze, Weil makes possible a non-devouring mode of looking, a “vegan gaze” 
cast by the camera, viewer, or critic. While the devouring look yields pleasure, looking 
without devouring is akin to love.  
Vegan cinema, therefore, does not refer to films about or in favour of veganism.9 Its 
rhetorical mode is not one of agitation or advocacy. There are plenty of films of this kind, but 
they more readily fall into the category Tom Tyler calls “vegan apologetics,” works that 
promote and defend veganism against repeated attacks by the dominant culture of eating 
animals.10 Though an essential component of the pro-animal toolkit, “outright vegan 
evangelism and apologetics cannot be adequate when confronted by carnism, the long-
established and largely normalized ideology and practice of everyday meat eating.”11 
Moreover, animal rights films, including those that explicitly support veganism, are often 
anthropocentric in their mode of address. They engage in persuasion and emotional 
identification (often supported by mind-boggling statistics, and factual exposés). There are 
various problems with these methodologies, not least their assumption that human behaviour 
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is governed by reason, and that individual responses are sufficient for long-term societal 
change.   
Veganism as I am using it here functions differently, as neither argument nor as a 
personal choice. Instead, it indicates the ways in which films, or moments in films, call 
attention to the complicity between the desire to look and to eat, and in so doing invoke a 
vegan way of being in the world. This kind of veganism is complicated, incomplete, and not 
strictly limited to a vegan diet, though it encompasses that too. Nor is it quite the stealthy 
veganism that Tyler ingeniously names (after the Trojan horse) “vejan” practice. Its 
indirectness is in the spirit of disinterest and detachment it cultivates with respect to the 
objects of the world. Weil expresses this logic clearly in her Notebooks: “To draw back 
before the object we are pursuing. Only what is indirect is effective. We do not accomplish 
anything if we have not first drawn back.”12 More than anything, veganism is an orientation 
towards reality: an approach which is also a kind of retreat, reticence before the other when 
confronted by the other’s sovereign existence. As a realist medium, film has always shared 
such orientation.  
 Realism in film has an esteemed critical pedigree. Vegan cinema as an articulation of 
realism looks back to the tradition of realist film theory, from André Bazin to Siegfried 
Kracauer.13 But in focusing on the parallels between looking and eating, I stay closest to 
Weil, for whom reality was a bulwark against the seductions of the imagination—not a 
substance or a content but a process that continually refuses the psychological rewards of 
wishful thinking. To see reality is to perceive attentively and without consolation. An 
adequate perception of the real is, for Weil, the ultimate yardstick of value since the real 
alone can lead one to the good, that rare state of grace that redeems without deluding. Weil’s 
realism is not, then, a naïve faith in the ability to perceive the thing-in-itself. Reality is what 
we most likely recoil from: “A test of what is real is that it is hard and rough.”14 And still, 
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“We must prefer real hell to an imaginary paradise.”15 The logic is simple: real hell is 
preferable because it is real.  
How might the cinema, and in particular animal cinema, exercise this preference? 
How does film register the real, whether hellish or benign, while eschewing the distortions of 
the imagination? Is the link to the real a matter of format, affected by the shift from 
photographic to digital filmmaking? Does CGI, for example, retain something of the 
materiality of animals, materiality that for Bazin and Kracauer was rooted in the 
photographic nature of the medium? The recent turn to CGI animals in films like Life of Pi 
(Lee, 2012), the revived Planet of the Apes franchise (2011-2017), or the vegetarian-themed 
Noah (2014), allows productions to largely do away with on-camera use of live animals while 
achieving a high degree of verisimilitude.16 But whether or not such films are “vegan” in the 
sense explored here, and whether they comply with Weil’s definition of realism, depends on 
the degree to which the films unfold what Weil calls “necessary connections” among their 
various elements.17 Realism demands that the relations depicted in the film appear as 
necessary, empty of subjective projection that invests the film-world with extraneous values.   
What rings true in Noah is not its dietary didacticism, but its honest reckoning with 
the aversion Noah feels towards his fellow humans. Animal liberation advocates are quick to 
reject accusations of misanthropy, both psychologically (the common counter-claim that 
animal rights people do not hate humans), and analytically (intersectionality has become a 
catchall term for structurally linking the oppression of humans and animals). But confronting 
the animal calamity can be wounding in ways that are not easily expressible because they cut 
across life’s various domains. Neither simply traumatizing, nor enraging or animating, 
bearing witness to animals exiles one to a world—our world—whose coordinates are 
unfamiliar; how is one to navigate such a place?18 Noah’s realism resides in connecting the 
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no longer repressible knowledge of humanity’s capacity for evil with the unmooring of 
subjectivity that such knowledge brings.19  
Realism, then, does not appeal to art’s indexical power to show things “as they are,” 
since art is inescapably about mediation. For Weil, realism primarily means surpassing a 
certain kind of romanticism that views the world as a reflection of one’s mental state: “[a] 
work of art which is inspired by sensual or psychological phenomena cannot be of the very 
first order.”20 Looking and eating are metaphors for the two creative dispositions: 
romanticism for which the world is but the vessel of the outpouring of self, and realism that 
attends to the world impersonally. The latter comports itself towards the mechanism that 
governs all worldly phenomena, which Weil called “necessity.”  
 
III. Eating out  
Not only is Louis Lumière’s Le Repas de bébé/ Baby’s Lunch (1895) arguably the earliest 
depiction of eating in film, it illustrates the divergence in cinema of two orders of looking: 
looking-as-eating, and looking-without-devouring.21 Repas de bébé features Auguste and 
Marguerite Lumière feeding their baby Andrée in the garden of their Lyon home. It is said 
that audiences were attracted not by the culinary drama at the centre of the frame, but by the 
motion of leaves in the background.   
 
Fig. 6.1 Repas de bébé 
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It is no coincidence, I think, that one of cinema’s pioneering examples places the act 
of eating centre frame. As an image of consumption, the bourgeois dining ritual at the heart 
of Repas de bébé stands in for other domestic pursuits that film would reflect back at its 
growing middle-class audience, and more decisively, for the ways in which cinema itself 
would become an object of mass consumption, with eating and drinking integral to the 
commercial movie-going experience.  
Memorable examples of films about eating include Marco Ferreri’s gross-out satire 
La Grande Bouffe (1973), and Gabriel Axel’s quiet and mannered Babette’s Feast (1987). 
Ferreri’s exposes the bottomless pit of consumption of the bodies of animals and women, 
while Babette’s Feast proceeds in the opposite direction, from ascetic self-denial to the 
rekindling of the sensual pleasures of food. But the role of eating in film is more fundamental 
still: eating mimics the ways in which cinema appropriates—captures, records, and 
projects—its objects of sight.22 It is no coincidence either that Repas de bébé foregrounds an 
image of (food) consumption while occasioning a form of (image) consumption that eschews 
the devouring we see in the film. The Lumière film illustrates a basic division in cinema 
between looking and eating as two modes of engagement and approach, which signal 
different economies of desire with regard to the objects of sight. In placing side by side the 
central image of the feeding baby and the peripheral image of the moving leaves the film 
intimates the devouring gaze as the mainstay of filmic appropriation, and its non-voracious 
alternative that attends to objects at a distance, and lets them be. 
What was it about the peripheral movement of leaves that so charmed viewers over 
and above the principal human drama of Repas de bébé? In an essay on the Lumières’ early 
films, Dai Vaughan suggested that “what most impressed the early audiences were what 
would now be considered the incidentals of scenes: smoke from a forge, steam from a 
locomotive, brick dust from a demolished wall […] the rustling of leaves in the 
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background.”23 Incidentals for Vaughan demonstrate cinema’s aptitude at capturing, not any 
kind of movement, but spontaneous, contingent movement.24 The Lumières’ “harnessing of 
spontaneity” was revolutionary because it captured anew the impersonal mechanisms of 
life.25 The beauty of the fluttering leaves made visible the operation of natural forces, 
undirected by human hands, to which the cinema is witness. Pleasure in this and other 
Lumière actualities that feature staged or semi-staged human action alongside the display of 
natural phenomena like the motion of waves or the gust of wind derives from the gesture of 
“letting be”: the manifestation of necessity as the mechanism of the world.  
 The conception of beauty as the thing we let be is reminiscent for Weil of God’s 
original abandonment of the world, his giving up power and retreating in order for beings and 
things to exist. Veganism is similarly a practice of creative renunciation that seeks a way of 
eating, of nourishment and survival, that lets others be, others whom we refuse to reduce to 
disposable, consumable things. At the moment of cinema’s inception, the Lumière film 
already provides an alternative genealogy of the natural world on screen, since the leaves in 
the wind are literally useless. Their function is purely revelatory: they affirm the world as 
extrinsic to human intentions, and are all the more beautiful for it.  
 The looking/eating analogy hinges on the experience of beauty that “promises but 
never gives anything; it stimulates hunger but has no nourishment for the part of the soul that 
looks in this world for sustenance. It feeds only the part of the soul that gazes.”26 As Lissa 
McCullough explains:  
Beauty feeds the part of the soul that gazes […] the pure part that receives and consents to the 
real, to what is. Whereas the will desires to feed on the world, purified desire or supernatural 
love utters its “eternal yes” to the world across a distance, a space of resignation, through 
gaze alone. Feasting on the world through gazing alone is what Weil calls eternal beatitude, 
a state where to look is to eat.27 
 
The strictness of Weil’s conception of the feasting/fasting gaze is likely to arouse some 
resistance, not unlike the opposition to veganism that labels the practice as absolutist or 
purist.28 It is not uncommon for veganism to be associated with eating disorders, including 
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anorexia, a condition that Weil is sometimes assumed to have suffered from.29 As Laura 
Wright notes, some media reports and pseudo-scientific studies “link plant-based diets with 
female disordered consumption.”30 Whether or not Weil suffered from anorexia, and whether 
certain vegans do, seems like the less interesting question. Nevertheless, in Weil’s 
conception, looking-without-devouring does deeply affect the subject who looks, and 
veganism, too, I would argue, entails a recalibration of subjectivity.  
 But why frame the discussion of looking in film in terms of veganism? I have already 
explained that Weil links looking and eating in ways that invite questions on power, 
representation, and ethics. The normative resonance of “vegan” is no less important. New 
ways of thinking are emerging that theorize veganism’s place in the cultural conversation, 
describe it as a Foucauldian “counter conduct,” and as a “form of life.”31 These approaches 
exceed the notion of veganism as a dietary proscription or a lifestyle choice.32  
 For Dinesh Wadiwel, the relentless violence that animals suffer warrants the title of 
“war.” War is the deep substructure underpinning humans’ treatment of animals, and minor 
reforms to the conditions in which animals live and die can do little to change it. To be 
meaningful, resistance must confront the “set of violences that are deeply embedded into 
almost every conceivable facet of human organisation, life, and knowledge,” seeking ways in 
which to “disrupt and enact a sphere of peace within the war on animals, not only in 
intervening in the institutional reproduction of violence, but also in etching a new set of 
truths that might enable recognition of animal sovereignties.”33  
While it is impossible to extract oneself completely from the “set of violences” 
against animals that saturates and sustains daily life, whether one is vegan or not, veganism is 
a symbolic and concrete refusal to bear arms in the war on animals. Vegan practice  
is distinctive in so far as it is not merely reflective of a set of political beliefs, but works 
across different levels of conduct; vegan practitioners typically modify their ways of living 
and consumption substantially against prevailing norms. […] I would suggest that 
veganism—in so far as it seeks to disrupt an institutional system and a system of truth—
would figure as a perfect example of a contemporary model of counter-conduct.34 
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Since the subjection of animals is pervasive, it necessarily pertains also to the 
production of and knowledge about art.35 Modes of nonviolent looking in the realm of art 
reflect the practice of veganism in the culinary realm. Both embody an impossible but valiant 
attempt to engage with the world without consuming it. As a counter-conduct within the 
discipline of film studies, moreover, vegan cinema disrupts the humanism that continues to 
inform the understanding and teaching of film. In practical, pedagogical terms, this means 
taking animals for granted as fully-fledged cinematic subjects: beings whose existence 
cinematically matters (in the sense of being physically and significantly present).36 
Approaching animals in this way helps to produce an alternative body of knowledge on film, 
which recognizes, and potentially reframes, the violence done to animals within the 
representational logic and apparatus of cinema.37  
 
IV. Looking and eating in Wendy and Lucy  
Animals are present throughout Kelly Reichardt’s films, from River of Grass (1995) to 
Certain Women (2016). Wendy and Lucy (2008), the first in the so-called Michelle Williams 
trilogy (followed by Meek’s Cutoff [2010] and Certain Women) is a clear articulation of a 
vegan cinematic sensibility.38  
In Wendy and Lucy, the proximity and abundance of food is proportionate to its 
unavailability. But what is an absolute necessity in life—to eat—is anathema in Reichardt’s 
cinema. Here, the opposite logic prevails: retreat and restraint grant solidity to what we see. 
Characters are left, painfully and inconclusively, to the whims of circumstance. Narratives 
refrain from doing too much or speaking too loudly.39 The films are slow and sparse, with a 
preference for the long or medium long-shot, few musical cues and little by way of 
background information or psychological insight.40 
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 In a long sequence at the grocery store, the themes of consumption, looking, and 
eating resurface. The sequence opens with images of shiny produce. A stack of green apples 
tempts Wendy, but she can only look (and touch), not eat.   
 
Fig. 6.2 Wendy and Lucy  
 
In desperation, Wendy slips a can of dogfood into her bag. But on leaving the store, she is 
stopped by Andy, the zealous shop assistant (undoubtedly on minimum wage) who insists on 
alerting the manager. “If a person can’t afford dog food, they shouldn’t have a dog,” he 
admonishes her. The rest of film revolves around Wendy’s attempts to find Lucy, missing 
after Wendy’s arrest for shoplifting.  
Not only do Wendy and Lucy share the film’s title, both risk devouring by a brutal 
system of economic exchange. The grocery store scene richly illustrates the relationship 
between the eaters and the eaten. In a film where pets end up in the dog pound, farmed 
animals end up as dog food, and the poor maintain the system of production of cheap goods, 
vulnerability is a matter of degree, not of species.  
The can of Iams dog food that Wendy steals contains animal “derivatives.”41 In 2002, 
Iams, then a subsidiary of Procter & Gamble, faced legal action by animal rights organization 
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals for its cruel practices of animal testing.42 And 
while Wendy is on her way to Alaska to produce seafood items she herself is unlikely to be 
able to afford, Andy is only too keen to enforce the law on behalf of the owners of the means 
of production. Wendy, Lucy, Andy, and countless, nameless, farmed animals are all 
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positioned somewhere along the axis of power in a system intent on dissolving solidarity and 
companionship, not least between humans and animals.  
 
Fig. 6.3 Wendy and Lucy 
 
Sophie Mayer claims that the film’s “affective relationships,” such as the one between 
Wendy and Lucy, “run counter to heteropatriarchal capitalism, and even act as a form of 
resistance to, or way out of, its narrow confines.”43 But there is nothing to suggest that 
Wendy is sensitive to the plight of animals in general; after all, she is on her way to seek 
work in one of Alaska’s fisheries. I am unsure about the disruptive potential of the film’s 
“affective relationships.” It is rather in the confluence of gazes the film makes possible, in 
the obscurity and opacity of its characters, and in the moments of divergence from 
conventional narrative and framing that an end to violence can be glimpsed.   
In a scene at a bottle returning facility, Lucy wanders off-screen. Wendy (or 
Williams) calls her back, and Lucy casually re-enters the frame.  
 
    
 
Fig. 6.4 & 6.5, Lucy out of frame 
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The frame does not enclose or control. Its openness mirrors Lucy’s autonomy. Where dogs in 
film are often valued for their ability to cleverly follow orders, Lucy’s role is more akin to a 
cameo. The credits list Lucy “as herself.” No gimmick, Lucy’s presence is a stamp of the 
film’s (neo-neo) realism. 44 We need only recall the shameful antics of Uggie the impeccably 
trained Jack Russell in the hit film The Artist (Hazanavicius, 2011) to appreciate the 
difference. Whereas in The Artist, animal motion is tightly controlled, Reichardt (like 
Lumière) is interested in the incidentals of motion. Through either training or editing, 
performing animals yield visual pleasure as the mark of control. Instead of training the 
animal to perform for the camera, Reichardt’s camera trains its gaze on the untrained animal.  
In an interview Reichardt said that Williams “loved the way she was so invisible as 
Wendy, how she slipped into this landscape; I don’t remember anybody recognizing her 
during shooting.”45 Anonymity is a feature of the parity between human and nonhuman life, 
an attribute of their shared exposure to hunger, isolation, or force which, in turn, heightens 
their interdependence. The vitality of screen animals derives from their flesh and blood 
vulnerability, a mark of authenticity that some filmmakers exploit.46 And although Reichardt 
stops short of questioning the contexts of domestication and farming that recur in her films, 
Wendy and Lucy does not wreak violence on its vulnerable protagonists. Instead, it abandons 
them to the lugubrious blankness of the Walgreen car park, the gas station, and the suburban 
backyard where Lucy is finally left.  
 
V. On being-devoured (in film) 
The beauty of the world is the mouth of a labyrinth. The unwary individual who on entering takes 
a few steps is soon unable to find the opening. Worn out, with nothing to eat or drink, in the dark, 
separated from his dear ones, and from everything he loves and is accustomed to, he walks on 
without knowing anything or hoping anything, incapable even of discovering whether he is really 
going forward or merely turning around on the same spot. But this affliction is as nothing 
compared with the danger threatening him. For if he does not lose courage, if he goes on walking, 
it is absolutely certain that he will finally arrive at the center of the labyrinth. And there God is 
waiting to eat him. Later he will go out again, but he will be changed, he will have become 
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different, after being eaten and digested by God. Afterward he will stay near the entrance so that 
he can gently push all those who come near into the opening.47 
In this curious tale, earthly beauty leads one to God the devourer. The devoured person re-
enters the world utterly transformed. For Weil, an appreciation of the beauty of reality calls 
for a radical contraction of self: “May I disappear in order that those things that I see may 
become perfect in their beauty from the very fact that they are no longer things that I see.”48 
The self is a barrier between God and creation, and must be eroded. The self is eaten, but 
survives, barely, so that it might perceive the world in its own absence.  
So far, I have discussed veganism as the non-devouring stance of looking rather than 
eating. But, “with nothing to eat or drink,” subjectivity itself is reduced to the point of 
annihilation. From the position of eater, the self becomes the eaten. If the vegan gaze 
approaches the object without devouring it, “might we say that each step or movement in the 
‘approach without devouring’ is also an instance of a vegan becoming herself devourable?”49 
How might cinema reflect this undoing of human subjectivity by embracing the human-as-
edible?  
 The cinema is replete with examples of humans being eaten. But only a handful of 
films wander the labyrinth to ponder the meaning of human edibility. In Steven Spielberg’s 
blockbuster Jaws (1975), an oversized shark consumes the bland beachgoers of Amity 
Island.50 Horror in Jaws and its increasingly ludicrous sequels ensues from the tantalizing 
outrage of humans as food. Yet as a genre film in which eating people is depicted as 
transgressing the laws of nature, Jaws carefully controls the irreverence of its proposition, 
foreclosing deeper questions about what Matthew Calarco has called humans’ “being-toward-
meat.”51  
Val Plumwood’s essay “Being Prey” (1995), in which the ecofeminist philosopher 
recalls her near fatal encounter with a crocodile in Australia’s Kakadu National Park, 
challenges the “monster myth” of films like Jaws or Crocodile Dundee (1986). The 
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encounter leads Plumwood to reposition herself alongside other animals by considering 
herself as food. This is no intellectual exercise, but a new knowledge borne out by 
experience. While canoeing, Plumwood is attacked by a crocodile and seriously wounded. As 
she struggles to free herself from the crocodile’s grip, Plumwood experiences something like 
Weil’s obliteration of self: “I glimpsed the world for the first time, ‘from the outside,’ as a 
world no longer my own, an unrecognizable bleak landscape composed of raw necessity.”52 
“I had survived the crocodile attack,” Plumwood continues, “but still had to survive the 
contest with the cultural drive to represent such experiences in terms of the masculinist 
monster myth: the master narrative”53 that denies “the brute fact of being prey,”54 our being 
“part of the food chain, eaten as well as eater.”55 The master narrative remains intact in Jaws 
and most other horror films, but is exploded in Werner Herzog’s remarkable Grizzly Man 
(2005).56 
Grizzly Man is often read as a cautionary tale about Timothy Treadwell’s deadly 
desire to become a bear. But Grizzly Man’s real achievement is not the Deleuzian adventure 
of “becoming-animal,” but the “becoming-edible” of the human—a more far-reaching 
transformation. It is by making legible and visible the possibility of perceiving oneself as 
food that human exceptionalism, voiced by Herzog and most of the film’s interviewees, is 
most profoundly dislodged. Like Weil’s sojourner, Treadwell is devoured at the centre of a 
labyrinth, a remote area dubbed the “Grizzly Maze.” Grizzly Man brilliantly completes the 
meaning of veganism by entertaining the full extent of human vulnerability.57  
 
VI. Conclusion: raw necessity  
The human as simultaneously devouring and devoured is the subject of Julia Ducournau’s 
debut feature, Raw (2017).58 Ducournau understands that for the human to become-edible in 
film, restrictions of genre and the monster myth must be transcended. Indeed, Raw’s 
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strongest moments are not those that graphically depict cannibalism. Cannibalism as a 
challenge to common conceptions of humanness is most compelling in the film’s more 
contemplative scenes. Raw is at its weakest when half-heartedly toying with questions of 
animal rights and positing vegetarianism in opposition to cannibalism. This resorts to 
precisely the sort of ontological simplifications about humanity that the film is otherwise 
eager to subvert.  
To shift the ontological goalposts, Raw sets itself apart from supernatural horror in the 
ordinariness of its culinary aberrations. Cannibalism does not rupture the natural order but 
darkly illuminates it. Twice, the film invokes a vegan cinematic sensibility by harking back 
to Lumière’s historic trope of the fluttering leaves. Raw opens with a shot of a tree-lined 
road, still but for the leaves gently swaying in the wind.  
 
Fig. 6.6 Raw  
 
The road is empty, but we soon notice a female figure walking towards the camera by the 
side of the road. When a car approaches, the road becomes the site of an orchestrated crash, a 
feeding ground of human flesh. Later on, sisters Justine (Garance Marillier) and Alexia (Ella 
Rumpf) return to the road, hidden amidst the vegetation, waiting to eat.59   
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Fig. 6.7 Raw  
 
The light breeze in the trees, we might presume, signals the quiet before the storm. 
But its proper function is, I believe, more like the leaves in the wind in Repas de bébé: no 
mere backdrop to an al fresco meal but the purveyor of necessity. The leaves, the wind, and 
the young women are absorbed into the natural order, equally subject to the mechanisms of 
earthly life. In interviews, Ducournau has insisted that cannibals are unlike vampires or 
werewolves because they actually exist. Neither monsters nor supernatural beings, cannibals 
are, and remain, human. Their very existence calls for a reconsideration, not of what it means 
to be human, but of what we mean when we fall back on the term to understand our own 
existence. “In the beauty of the world,” says Weil, “brute necessity becomes an object of 
love.”60 If the necessity, or reality, of cannibalism is, as it were, written on the wind, the 
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